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The Macroeconomic Effects of the
Recent Fall in Oil Prices
John A. Tatom
ETWEENthe end of 1985and the second quarter
of1986, oil prices fell by about half, the reverse of the
near doubling of oil prices in both 1973—74 and in
1979—81.’ This decline prompted a renewed debate
about the effects of oil price changes- and whether the
effectsofoil pricedeclines are simplythe reverse of oil
price increases, that is, whether the effects are sym-
metric. This article examines these issues. A theoreti-
cal analysis of oil and energy price effects on the
economyis presented first, alongwith some evidence
on the actual effects of oil price increases on the
United States and other countries. While the theory
indicates symmetric effects, several arguments sug-
gest the 1986 oil price decline will not haveequal and
opposite, or symmetric, effects on the economy.
THE THEORETICAL CHANNELS OF
OIL PRICE EFFECTS
There are several channels through which an oil
price ‘shock,” an unanticipated change in the level of
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‘Thispaper pays little attention to the rise in U.S. oil prices from about
$13.40 per barrel in the fourth quarter of 1986 to about $17.00 per
barrel in March of 1987. The adjustments in early 1987 are not large
enough to affect the arguments below.
oil prices, could affect the economy. The first is
through its effect on aggregate supply; this has,come
to be called a “price shock.” In this view, an oil price
increase results in an initial upward shift in the aggre-
gate supply curve that will raise prices; output falls
along a downward-sloping aggregate demand curve.
Subsequent wage adjustments, however, can restore
the initial level of output and price. This analysis can
be found in many textbooks?
The effect of oil price shocks on aggregate supply is
more involvedthan simply a rise in the costof output,
however. Energy price shocks are changes in relative
prices; to make such changes effective, the supply of
energy must be altered.’ To the extent that energy is a
factor of production, the production possibilities and
aggregate supply conditions of the economy are al-
‘See, for example, Hall and Taylor (1986, pp. 134—35). Despite the
unique fit of past experience with theemerging “real business cycle
theory” which emphasizes productivity shocks, such theorists tend
to ignore oil price changes as a source of such shocks; for example,
Prescott (1986) maintains that oil price shocks do not affect a
country’s production possibilities.
‘Alternatively, many transitory price shocks occur from quantity
shocks that are transmitted through transitory relative price
changes. The characterization of price or quantity shocks is unim-
portant in theory. Quantity shocks, however, are typically transitory
and associated with transitory relative price changes,while perma-
nent macroeconomic shocks of a “cost-push” type tend to be
associated with permanent changes in relative prices that also
affect potential or naturaloutput.
34FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1987
tered.~Energy price shocks alter the incentives for
finns to employ energy resources and alter theiropti-
mal methods of production. Energy-using capital is
rendered obsolete by an energy price increase, opti-
mal usage of the existing stock is altered, labor re-
sources are diverted to economize on energy use and
production switches to less energy-intensive technol-
ogies.’ Thus, existing capital and labor resources are
incapable ofproducing as much output as before.The
reduced capacity output of the economy is usually
referred to as a decline in potential or natural output.
A second channel emphasizes an effect on aggre-
gate demand. Analysts use a “tax analysis” in which
domestic aggregate demand is affected due to a
change in net imports of oil. In this analysis, the
direction and extent of effects depend on the coun-
try’s net oil export status. Countries that are self-
sufficient in oil are unaffected by oil price shocks,
while net exporting countries experience an increase
(decrease) in aggregate demand when oil prices rise
(fall). The effect on net oil importing countries is ex-
actlv the opposite.”
Such a simple characterization, however, ignores
the effects of oil pricechanges on productivity, which
tendto work in thesame direction regardless ofthe oil
trade status of the country. Thus, a focus on trade
status would suggest that Canada, whose net oil ex-
ports equaled 0.4 percent ofGDP in 1973, would have
had a boost to aggregate demand, or output and
employment, from the 1973—74 oil price rise, and that
theUnited Kingdom, which became a net oil exporter
in 1979, would have had a similar gain from the 1979—
81 oil price hike. Neither conclusion is supported by
‘This is the emphasis in Rasche and Tatom(1977a, b.c and 1981).
Hickman (1984) discusses this channel in a study of 14 macroeco-
nomic models. Heindicatesthat the participants in the studygener-
ally agreed there is such an effect, but that formal estimates of it
were included in only six of the 14 models. Phelps (1978) and
Gordon (1975) implicitly recognize the shift in production possibili-
ties in models that treat a supply shock as a shift in a fixed supply of
resources. Related theoretical and empirical analyses are dis-
cussed in Tatom (1987).
‘Baily (1981) and (1982) emphasizes the capital obsolescence argu-
ments. Fischer (1985) incorporatesthis effect in a model of aggre-
gate supply. Wilcox (1983) successfully tested the interest rate
implications of the energy-induced decline in the marginal productiv-
ity ofcapital.
°Hickman(1984) breaks this aggregate demand shift for an oil price
increase into a domestic “terms of trade” effect that reduces domes-
ticdisposable income and a net export effect due to reducedforeign
income. His argument for an aggregate demandshiftalso includes a
shiftdue to a discretionary policy response in the face of an oil price
shock.
evidence on real output, employment or productivity
growth? Similarly, while this argument suggests that
output and employment in the United Kingdom
would have been adversely affected by the 1986 de-
cline in oil prices, theevidence againdoes not support
the conclusion.
In most models of the economy, price shocks oper-
ating through aggregate supply have the dominant
effect. Hickman (1984) examines 14 large and small
scale econometric models and finds that aggregate
prices respond quite similarlyto an oil shock and that
the modelsare linear and symmetric so that aggregate
price level responses are proportional to the magni-
tude ofthe oil price shock.”The Hickman (1984) study
also indicates that oil price shocks affect aggregate
demand only minimally in several models of the U.S.
economy because:
incipient deterioration in the terms of trade from the
increase in the price of oil imports is partly offset by
the induced rise of export prices, and because the
decline ofworld production does not impinge heavily
on U.S. exports (p. 91).
The channels of influence on aggregate supply can
be seen infigure 1, which shows the aggregate supply
and demand for aggregate real output. Initially, the
price level is P. and output is y0. A higher oil price for
an oil-importing countrywould reduce aggregate net
exports and shift the aggregate demand curve, Al),, to
the left, according to the aggregate demand channel
above. Ifthis were the onlyeffect, both output and the
price level would fall. This effect is not included in the
figurebecause of its dubious merit and to focus on the
aggregate supply channel. The “price shock” raises
the supply price of aggregate output for any level of
output, thus, the aggregate supply curve, AS,, shifts
upwardto AS,. Figure 1 also incorporates the capacity
output; thus, the aggregate supply curve, AS0, shifts
with a relatively steep slope at the initial level of real
output (y,) to reflect the notion that at y,, existing
supplies of domestic capital and labor resources are
fully employed, and price level variations cannot in-
duce larger use of energy, given the relative price of
7See Rasche and Tatom (1981) and the evidence below.
“The linear and symmetric issues were addressed by comparing
simulation outcomes for a number ofenergy shocks including a2 0
percent increase or decrease in the price of oil and a 50 percent
increase in the price. Hickman also notes that most models have
unitary price elasticities of aggregate demandso that “the relative
magnitude of the output and price responses to an oil shock is
similar across models, with big output reductions accompanying
large price increases and vice-versa” (p. 93).
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energy, or increase supplies of other resources. When
energy prices rise, the aggregate supply curve shifts
upward, but the level of output corresponding to full
utilization of existing labor and capital resources also
shifts to the left,y,?
In capital andlabor markets,this productivityloss is
manifested in lower real wages and, over time, in a
smallercapital stock relative to labor. The latter effect
reinforces the initial productivity loss and shows up as
a reduction in gr-owth of the capital stock and eco-
nomic capacity during the period of adjustment to a
lowered desired capital-laborratio. Since the theoreti-
cal channel is reversible, energy price reductions have
equal and opposite effects to those of an energy price
increase; in figure 1, an equal-sized energy price re-
duction shiftsaggregate supplyfrom AS, to AS,,.”Thus,
this approach implies that energy price changes have
symmetr’ic influences on the econonw.
Some International Evidence From
Earlier OilPrice Changes
‘rhe theory presented above suggests that eneigy
price shocks should affect the productivity of capital
and labor resources similarly across countries. Sup-
port for this view is provided by Rasche and Tatom
(1981), using production function estimates for Can-
ada, the UnitedKingdom, Germany, Franceand Japan.
More recent evidence can be found using business
sector data for these countries and Italy prepared by
Helliwell, et al (1986) for- the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD).” This
data can be used to demonstrate the significance of
‘Analyses like that in figure 1, but which ignore the shift in capacity,
have upward sloping supply curves at (P,, y,) that suggest that the
former output level, y,, is achievable if government policy can raise
aggregatedemand sufficiently;viewed anotherway,these analyses
suggest that the decline in output from y, toy,, involves a reduction
in employment of existing labor and capital resources.
“In Rasche and Tatom (1977a, b, c and 1981), aggregate demand
shifts play no essential role. Shifts in oil imports or exports are
presumably offset by corresponding changes in other imports or
exports or by changes in other components of aggregate demand.
This analysis also emphasizes that optimal policy responses are
effectively limited or absent because economic capacity is changed,
and the economy adjusts to energyprice shocks relativelyquickly.
Output cannot be “restored’ to its original level through short-run
aggregate demand management. Moreover, such policies work
slowly relative to the dynamics of adjustment to a supply shock, so
that the effects of oil price shocks are largely completed before
monetary and fiscal policy effects could have an impact on them.
“These data, updated and revised from the original article, were
ldndlyprovided by Mr. PeterJarrett and Mr. G. Salou of the OECD.
Output
the general predictions of the theoretical analysis for
earlier energy price increases.”
The top panel oftable 1 presents the annual average
growth rate of the relative price of energy from the
OECD data set.”Table 1 also shows thegrowth rates of
output perworker, capital perworker, and energyper
worker in the seven countries. Two periods including
“TheOECD data on the businesssectorwas prepared todevelop the
supply-side of the OECD’s macroeconomic model for seven coun-
tries. Two important characteristics of this data are the consistency
of measurement across countries and the development of the
energy purchases series. Helliwell et al. (1986) do not directly
address the symmetry issue or whether variations in energy pur-
chases fully capture the effects of energy price shocks on aggregate
supply. Energy price effects work through changes in the relative
costofcapital and energy in their model, sotheeffects are implicitly
symmetric.
“These data are available from 1963 for all countries butJapan and
extend to 1983. The relative price of energy is constructed by
deflating the nominal price of business energy purchases by the
deflator forbusinesssectorgross output.Besides the United States,
only Italy, Germany, and Japan show declines forthis measure after
1981. The only decline for the latter three countries is in 1983 and
ranges from a decline of only 3.1 percent (Japan) to 5.1 percent
(Germany). The decline in the relative price of energy in the United
States from 1980 to 1985 and rise in most other countries is one of
the reasons given in Tatom (1986) for the improvement in productiv-
ity growth in the United States compared with other countries and,
therefore, the improved U.S. competitiveness and associated rise in
the valueofthe dollar in international exchange.
Figure 1
The Aggregate Supply Effect of
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The capital-per-worker growth rates also declined
in 1973—79 compared with those in 1965—73. Move-
ments in the capital-labor ratio are not indicators of
the desired capital-labor ratio when cyclical move-
ments in employment depart from laborforce growth.
Nonetheless, overthe 1979—83 period, four countries
showed a further deceleration; the growth of capital
per worker accelerated, however’, in the United States,
Canada and the United Kingdom.
As the bottom panel of table 1 shows, the growth
rate of energy per worker slowed markedly in each
country for each period. The largest reductions in
1973—79 were inJapan and Italy, the two countries in
which the largest reductions in the growth of output
per workeralso occurred. All countries showed larger
reductions in the growth of energy per worker in the
1979—83 period. The results in table 1 ar-c consistent
with the theoretical predictions that a rise in the
relative price of energy reduces both energy and capi-
tal per worker- and, therefore, lowers output.
Overthe period 1973—83, output per worker’ growth
slowed substantiaily in the seven countries when
compared to the 1965—73 period; reduced energy use
alone accounted for a substantial share of these re-
ductions without taking into account the energy
price-induced reductions in capital per worker.”
Some analysts have suggested that these develop-
ments will not be reversed, or at least not reversed in
proportional magnitudes, by the recent decline in the
relative price of oil and other’energy resources. Some
ofthese arguments are examined in the next section.
DO OIL PRICE INCREASES AND
DECREASES HAVE EQUAL AND
OPPOSITE EFFECTS?
the 1973—74 and 1979—81 oil price shocks and their
aftermath are shown, along with the 1965—73 trend in
eachvariable. The second panel shows the slowdown
in labor productivity from the 1965—73 trend during
each period. Japan and Italy had the sharpest reduc-
tions in the 1973—79 period. The slowdown in labor
productivity growth is more pronounced in all coun-
tries, except the United States and United Kingdom, in
the 1979—83period when compared with 1965—73.
Previous studies ofthe effectsofoil price changes on
the economy do not indicate that they are asymmet-
ric. Existing models of oil price effects are not formu-
lated in a manner that would reveal such asymmetric
effects, however. Besides, empirical models rely heav-
ily on the experience in the 197c1s, when real oil and
‘~The reductions in energy use per worker together with “output
elasticities of energyuse,” the percentage change in outputassoci-
ated with each percentage point change in energy use, can be used
to estimate the direct effect of the energy use reductions on output.
These elasticities, estimated in Tatom (1987), show that reduced
energy use had a substantial negative effect on output and produc-
tivity growth in these seven countries.
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Chart 1





energy prices did not decline.” There are some argu-
ments, however, that suggest the recent oil price de-
cline will not yield equal and opposite effects.
TheAsymmetric Effects ofTransitory vs~
Permanent OilPrice Declines
Ifthe recent decline in oil prices is only temporary,
there shouldbe no long-run adjustments of methods
of production, prices or employment. At least one
“Real oil prices and energy prices did decline through most of the
post-warperiod includedin the estimation of most models, but on a
steady and moderate trend rather than abruptly. Hamilton (1983),
however, indicatesthat therewere cyclical movements induced by
oil shocks before 1973.
perspective on the recent declines, however, suggests
that they are not likely to be reversed. According to
this view,the decontrol of the U.S. crude oil market in
early 1981 lowered OPEC’s optimal price of oil. This
view also suggests that OPECZ was due largely to
output changes associated with the Iran-Iraq war; if
correct, the OPEC2 price increase ultimately will be
reversed.” Consequently, the 1986 oil price reduction
is not atemporary aberration, but the continuation of
a downward oil priceadjustment that beganfive years
earlier.
“The analysis in Ott and Tatom (1 982a and b) and several of the
references cited there explain this argument.
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Chart 1 shows the relative price of oil from 1974 to
the end of 1986. The prices, measured relative to 1985
business sector’ prices, show the average U.S. refiner
acquisition cost for oil and for imported oil. The im-
ported price is included to indicate the world priceof
oil. The two prices differ until early-1981 because of
the entitlement system that heldthe U.S.pnce paid for
oil, whether domestic or foreign, below that in the
world market. Subsequent differences reflect minor
variations in the characteristics of domestic and im-
ported oil.Note thatthe U.S. realpriceofoilin 1974—78
averaged about $19.50 per ban-el (1985 prices) and
varied little. OPEC2 sent the wor’ld price up from $22
per barrel at the end of 1978 to about $46 per barrel in
the first quarter of 1981, when U.S. decontrol of the
domestic oil market occurred. Subsequently, the
world and domestic price of oil fell to about $27 per
barrel by late 1985, a decline of $17 to $19 per barrel,
then further declined to an average of about $14 per
barrel (1985 prices) in 1986.
An examination of chart I reveals three central
points: (1) the 1986 oil price decline is not unprece-
dented — the decline began in 1981; (2) the 1986
decline was exceeded by the larger reductions that
occurred from 1981 to theend of1985;and (3) not until
early 1986 had U.S. real oil prices fallento their 1974—78
levels. Thus, the recent shock makes the 1981—86
change comparable in magnitude to the 1979—SI in-
crease, except for thetiming.These results are consist-
ent with the view that the 1986 shock is permanent
and point to the factthat the United Stateshas had at
least five years of experience with declining real oil
prices”
Chart 2 shows the quar-terly relative price ofenergy
(measured by deflatingthe quarterly averageproducer
priceindexforfuel, power and relatedproducts by the
business sector price deflator from 1970 to the
present); the price has been indexed to 1972. Energy
prices show the same pattern asthe realpriceofoil in
chart 1, especially the relative magnitudes associated
“Since the initiating factor in OPEC2 has not totally disappeared,
further downward movement can be expected. In 1978, Iran and
Iraq produced 7.8 million barrels per day. This droppedto a low of
2.4 million barrels per day in 1981 and recovered Jo only about 4
million barrels per day at the end of 1985. Trehan (1986) presents
an “alternative” view of nominal oil prices, arguing that they are
driven by movements in the exchange value of the dollar. But
Trehan’s model only explains nominal price movements, given the
relative priceof oil, it does not account for the sharpnominal price
changes associated with relative price disturbances.
with the OPEC1 and OPEC2 increases and the 1981—86
decline. From the end of 1972 to the third quarter of
1974, thelogarithm of the relative price of ener-gy rose
45.8 percent; from the first quarter of 1979 to the first
quarter of 1981, it rose 47.9 per’cent; finally, from the
first quarter of1981 to the second quarter of 1986, it fell
51.8 percent. These changes were largely due to the
near doubling in real U.S. oil prices in each of the
earlier periods and the decline since early 1981.
OPEC’s incentive to maintain a lower- price than
prevailed as recently as 1985can be seen fromproduc-
tion and consumption developments since OPECZ. In
1973—79, world oil production (and, roughly, con-
sumption) ranged from about 59.7 millionto 62.5 mil-
lion barrels per day, of which OPEC produced about
30.7 million (in 1973 and 1979, the figures were 31.0
and 30.9, respectively). OPEC output declined to 16.1
million barrels per dayin 1985. World production also
fell,to about 53 million barrels per day in 1982—83, and
only recovered to about 54 million barrels per day in
1985. Thus, OPEC’s market share plummeted from
about 50 percent during 1973—79 to about 30 percent
ofa smallermarket in 1985.
Comparing 1979 and 1985, world consumption fell
about nine million barrels per day or- about 14.5 per-
cent, while non-OPEC production rose about six mil-
lion barrels per day,or about 20 percent. The decline
in the OPEC share arose from both a relatively large
increase in rest-of-the-world production and a de-
crease inworid consumption. OPEC, by late 1985,had
not adjusted fully to its lowered optimal price. In
1985—86, Iran and Iraq’sjoint production levelof about
3.6 million barrels per day, while 50 percent larger
than in 1981, was well below their 1973—78 joint pro-
duction level of 8 million barrels per day.
Since 1980, oil market developments have lowered
OPEC’s optimal price of oil. The actual price was
reduced gradually in an attempt to increase the quan-
tity of oil demanded and reduce competitors’ sup-
plies. By the end of 1985, such efforts had not been
successful; moreover, even if the price reductions
since then become somewhat successful, the rest of
OPEC will face a futureproblem — a decline in market
share and stronger incentive to lower prices — to the
extent that Iran-Iraq production eventually rises fur-
ther back toward pre-war’ levels. Thus, the recent
decline inworld oil pricesis not likely to be temporary
and its effects should not be asymmetric, at least not
on this account.
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Do OilPrice Changes HaveAsymmetric
Effects on Capital Obsolescence?
When oil prices rise, energy-using capital is ren-
dered obsolete, unless (I) product prices adjust suf-
ficiently, (2) product demand is unaffected, and (3)
other lower-cost methods of production are unavail-
able. In the absence of these conditions, increased
scrapping and/or alterations in the optimal employ-
ment of capital resources occurs. One approach to
obsolescence emphasizes “putty-clay” technology,
where the capital stock embodies a technology that is
premised on expected factor and product prices and
“fixed” relative factor proportions, for example, labor







factor prices change, the existing capital stock is no
longer optimal; any relative factor price change can
make the existing capital stock obsolete. Oil price
shocks (or other factor price shocks) reduce produc-
tivity by effectively destroying capital resources re-
gardless ofthe direction of change.
The concept of putty-clay capital suggests that
short-run relative factorproportions are insensitive to
factor price changes; it appears that output and em-
ployment can be altered only after sufficient time has
passed so that capital can be changed. But inelastic
factor proportions increase the short-run output loss
associated with a rise in energy prices. Firm and
industry output adjustments and industry product
Index (1972=100) Index (1972100)
300 300
1970 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 1987
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prices are larger when factor substitution cannot oc-
curin the short run because ofa change in the price of
one resource.” The asymmetric result from a putty-
clay perspective rests on the assumed relative ease of
shutting down the use of existing plant and equip-
ment compared withthe adjustment cost of installing
new capital or reemploying obsolete and idle capital.
But this difference, if it actually exists, is one of the
relative timing ofeffects. Thus, the putty-clay assump-
tion does not yield differences in the response of the
desired capital-laboror capital-energy ratioswhen the
relative price of energy changes. These determinants
of output and productivity respond similarlywhether
capital is putty-clay or not.
Are Firms’ Responses to Cost
Reductions and Cost Increases
Asymmetric?
Another argument is that firms respond differently
to factor price reductions than to increases. A factor
price increase forces adjustments because profitabil-
ity and survival are threatened. A factor price decline
gives rise to less pressure to change production meth-
ods; profits rise for energy-using firms even if they
don’t alter their behavior. A related argument is that
adjustments to energy price shocks depend on the
state of the economy, especially the state of the busi-
ness cycle. Capacity utilization was relatively high and
unemployment rates were relatively low when OPEC1
and OPEC2 occurred. These conditions have not been
observed since 1981. Thus, current incentives to ex-
pand production due to factor price reductions or
even to reduce product prices could be viewed as
weaker-. Incentives to expand the employment of
energy-using plant and equipment, especially
through new purchases, couldbe more limited inlight
of supposed weak demand for output.
These views ignore maximizing behavior or even
minimal interest in achieving efficiencyin the pursuit
of firms’ goals. Moreover, they ignore the effects of
competition from other- firms. Again, this argument
suggests, at best, a difference in the timing of adjust-
ments to a lower energy price shock, not an asymme-
try in the direction ormagnitude of theeffects oflower
energy prices.
DoInter-Industry Effects Result in
Asymmetric Macroeconomic Effects of
OilPrice Changes?
Another suggestion is that adverse effects on do-
mestic oil-related industries dominate the positive
developments forother industries when oil prices fall,
despite a recognition that the reverse effects do not
occur, or are not dominant, when oil prices rise. The
importance of reductions in oil exploration and devel-
opment activity and oil-related loan losses for the
macroeconomy have been overstated, however. The
effects are symmetric in that the domestic oil market
boomed following both OPECI and OPECZ, while the
dominant effects were on other producers-” More
importantly, however, reductions in such activity in
1986 reflected short-run responses that reverse when
factorprices in exploration adjust to the permanently
lower oil price.
Part of theconfusion overthe dominance of domes-
tic oil effects could arise from the apparent relatively
slow growth of employment following the 1986 oil
shock, especially early in the year. Yet this result is
consistent with the earlier experience with oil price
increases. In the initial period of a shock, the domi-
nant effect is on productivity and supply, given prod-
uct prices; with littleprice level adjustment, aggregate
demand changes little. Thus, when oil prices rise
sharply and unexpectedly, desired output falls more
than sales, resulting in undesired inventory reduc-
tions that create upward pressure on prices and, ini-
tially, downward cyclical pressure on the unemploy-
ment rate.’°Proponents of an asymmetric response in
1986 may be relying on an inaccurate comparison of
the adverse cyclical experience that followed past oil
price increases afterafewquarters andthe immediate
cyclical developments that followedthe 1986 oil price
reduction.
“It is curious that some analysts appear to ignore the short-run
pressure that the putty-clay assumption puts on reducing capacity
utilization through shutting down, arguing instead that the effects of
oil shocks work relatively slowly over extended periods of time as
the capital stock is adjusted. How individual product prices or the
price level can adjust relatively rapidly, as considerable evidence
shows, in the face ot the changes in “fixed” costs in the putty-clay
case, is not typically addressed.
“Some analysts contend that the U.S. experience in 1973—74 was
not comparable because of price controls on domestic crude oil.
See Trehan (1987), for example. This ignores the 75.3 percent rise
in domestic crude oil prices that occurred from 111/1973 to 111/1974,
despite the existence of controls, or the 196 percent increase from
January 1979 to January 1981, a period ofsimilar controls.
‘°See the unemployment rate discussion in Tatom (1981, 1 983b) and
more recent evidence in Ott and Tatom (1986).
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DO OIL PRICE REDUCTIONS HAVE
ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS? THE
EVIDENCE
Empirical macroeconomic models can provide evi-
dence on the symmetry issue because real oil and
energy prices have been falling for nearly six years. A
simple reduced-form model is used [see Tatom (1981,
1983b), (1987)1 to analyze the short-run effects of oil
price shocks. In addition, evidence from production
function estimates that have been used to assess the
productivity effects of adverse oil shocks is examined.
The evidence from these models on GNP, price and
output effects of energy price changes is presented
below. Finally, some evidence on symmetric tempo-
rary surges in inflationin seven countries isdiscussed.
TheModel
The Andersen-Jordan GNP equation (1968) ex-
pressedin growth rates andaugmented to account for
effects of the energy price changes is used in the
model. While such effects could be either permanent
or transitory, estimates reveal that the statistically
significant effects are only transitory. The price equa-
tion for the GNP deflator in this model is a reduced-
form equation in which the principal determinant of
inflation is the rate ofgrowth ofthe money stock (Ml);
price controls and energy price changes, however,
also influence the levelof prices and, temporarily, the
inflation rate. Since real GNP is the ratio of nominal
GNP to the pricedeflator, the growth rate ofreal GNP is
the difference between the growth rates of nominal
GNP and the GNP deflator.
The GNP equation includes a strike measure (the
change in the quarterly average of days lost due to
strikes deflated by thecivilian labor force), current and
four lagged values ofmoney (Ml) and federal expendi-
ture growth, andsix previous quarter’s changes in the
relative price of energy, (the quarterly average pro-
ducer price index for fuels, related products and
power, deflated by the business sector price deflator).
The priceequation includes the current and 20 lagged
growth rates of the money stock, dummy variables for
wage-price control (for 11/1971 to 1/1973) and decontrol
periods (1/1973 to 1/1975), and changes in the relative
priceof energyfor the past four quarters.
The model was estimated over the periods 1/1955 to
111/1980 and to 111/1986, respectively, in Tatom (1987)21
“Over the longer period, adjustments were made for systematic
overpredictions of ONP and price growth. These overpredictions are
The model and energy price effects are stable and two
tests rejected the hypothesis that energy price reduc-
tions since 1981 have had different effects, either in
sign or size, on GM’, price, or indirectly, output
growth. The two tests involved allowing post-1980
declines to have different effects on GNP or price
growth and, second, allowing energy price declines
throughout the sample to have different effects from
increases in energy prices.”
OilPrice Shocks and Real GNP
The effect of an oil price shock on output is deter-
mined from those on nominal GNP and prices. Since
the effect ofan energy price shock on the growth rate
and level of GNP is zero after six quarters, its effect on
output after that time is the inverse of its effect on the
price level. The model described above yields esti-
mates that indicate the responsiveness of the price
level to energy price changes has not changed since
1980; thus, the permanent responsiveness ofoutput to
such changes, has not changed. In addition, the tim-
ing and magnitude ofthe short-mn output effect has
remained unchanged as well. The elasticity of the
price levelwith respect toan energy price change (that
is, the percentage rise (fall) in the GNP deflator âssoci-
ated with each percentage point rise (fall) in the rela-
tive price ofenergy) is estimated to be 0.050 to 0.058.”
Thus, adoubling in oil prices ledto about a40 percent
energy price rise during OPECI, OPEC2, that, in turn,
resulted in apermanent increase in theprice level and
decrease in output of about 2 percent to 2.3 percent
[f40)U05) to (40)(.058)1 in each instance; the same size
uncorrelated with the right-hand-side variables or otherfactorsthat
various analysts claim explain a fall in velocity since 1981; see
Tatom (1 983a). The interceptshift in each equation was chosen by
finding the shiftthat minimized the standard errorof each equation
where the shift was allowed to occur in any quarter since 1978.
Christiano (1986) has shown thata trendvelocity shift ofthis type is
supported bythe stability of difference-stationarymodels. The shifts
used here begin in 11/1981 for the GNP equation and in Ill/i 982 for
the price equation.
“Athird test involvestesting an asymmetryhypothesis suggested by
Neumannand von Hagen (1987). Theyarguethat,given wagesand
prices, relative price uncertainty reduces aggregate supply. Thus,
an energy price change can reduce output and raise theprice level
regardless of whether energy prices rise or fall if it also raises
relative price uncertainty. For energy price increases, the direct
effect on aggregate supply and the uncertainty effect would rein-
force each other, but for energy price reductions, they work in
opposite directions. This hypothesiswas tested by introducing the
standard deviation of the relative price ofenergy and its lags in the
equation estimates; these measures are not significant in either
equation.
“This elasticity is the sum ofthe coefficientson the rate of changein
the relative priceof energy in the inflation equation.
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decline in oil prices from IV/1985 to 111/1988 is esti-
mated to result in the same size reduction in prices
and rise in output as in these earlier instances.
OilPrice Shocks and Productivity
The effect of energy price changes on productivity
can be evaluated by estimating an annual business
sector production function in which business sector
output, X, isregressed on business sectorhours, h,, the
product of the lagged net capital stock (constant dol-
lars) and Federal Reserve capacity utilization rate, Ic,,
the relative price of energy, p~,a constant, a trend, t,
and trend breaks in 1967, t67, and in 1977, t77.” The
production function is “Cobb-Douglas,” or linear in
logarithms and estimated with a constant returns to
scale” restriction.
The estimate for the period 1948—SO is (t-statistics
are given in parentheses):
(1) In X, = 0299 + 0.690 ln h, + 0.310 in Ic, — 0.053 p~
(0.80) (13.18) (5.90) (—2.49)
+ 0.019 t — 0.006 t67 — 0.008 t77
(10.97) N- 3.41) N— 1.96)
1k’ = 0.97 SE = 0.90% DW = 1.88 j5 = 025
The production function, estimated for the period
1948 to 1985, is:
(2) In X, = 0.377 + 0.701 ln h, + 0299 Ink1
— 0.055 p~
(1.15) (15.01) (6.41) —3.40)
+ 0.019 t — 0.006 t67 — 0.006 t77
(11.57) (—3.87) (—3.09)
= 0.97 SE = 0.80% DW = 1.84 5 = 0.28
There are no statistically significant differences be-
tween the estimates in equations I and 2. Hence,
adding five additional years of data during which
energy prices declined sharply produces no changes
in the estimates. Such evidence is only suggestive,
however. A more direct test is to allow the coefficient
on the energy price to be different after 1980. When
equation 2i sestimated permitting energy prices from
1981 to 1985 to have a different effect on output, the
‘~Rasche and Tatom (1977b, c and 1981) test a popular hypothesis
thatthe trend growth of productivity declined in 1967. The hypothe-
sis is rejected but, the results indicate a smaller size for the output
elasticity of energy prices when the insignificant trend~shift is in-
cluded. When recently revised NIPA dataare used, however, the
1967 trend breakcannot be rejected.
difference is 0.0016 (t = 0.94); while the change in the
coefficient is positive, indicating a smaller impact on
output, the difference is tiny and statistically insigni-
ficant. When equation 2i sused to predict business
sector output in 1986, the erroris 0.05 percent; that is,
business sector output grew3.31 percentfrom 1985 to
1986, nearly the same as the 3.36 percent predicted by
equation 2.
The output elasticity ofthe energy price in equation
2 is — 5.5 percent, smaller than earlier estimates where
trend shiftswere not statistically significant and, thus,
were omitted. Without the trend shifts in first-
difference estimates ofequation 1 and 2,the short-run
output elasticity ofthe energy price is8 percent.” Over
short periods, such as the past ten years, it is not
possible to determine whether trend shifts represent
truly permanent changes or whether they are simply
capturing residual effects due to energy price shocks
or other transitory effects on productivity trends. In
either case, the estimated output elasticity is in line
with the estimate from the reduced-form model
above.”
Oil Price Shocks and The Rate ofPrice
Increase
Price developments across the seven countries re-
ferred to ear1ier provide more casual evidence of a
symmetric response to therecent decline in oil prices.
The top paneloftable 2 shows that, during the period
of the previous two oil price increases, inflation rates
temporarily surged upward from levels in the preced-
ingyearand subsequently fell back. Since thetiming of
the peak rate of increase for a four-quarter period
varied among the countries, inflation measures for
“Tatom (1987) reports the resultsofboth ofthetests used in theONP
and price equation above for the first-differenced production func-
tion. First, theenergyprice declines from 1981 to 1985 wereallowed
to have differential effects on business sector output growth. Sec-
ond, energy price increases and decreases in the period 1948 to
1985 weretreated as two separate variables. A test of whether the
coefficientsof thesevariablesareequal andopposite in sign isatest
of symmetry. Both ofthese tests failto reject symmetry. Finally, the
standard deviation of real energyprice changes (measured over the
current and previous two years) was addedto the level equation 2
and itsfirst-differencewas addedto thefirst-difference equation. It is
not significant in either caseand doesnot altertheothercoefficients,
“Theemphasis aboveis on the output elasticity of the relative price of
energy, given capital and labor employment. Rasche and Tatom
(1981, p. 13, and elsewhere) explain that the desired capital-labor
ratiofalls (rises)due to anenergy pricerise (decline), and that, given
potential employment, the long-run response is largerbya percent-
age equal to 5,/s. where s, ands arethe shares of capital and labor
in value added- Inequations (1) and (2) this incrementto the output
elasticity is 44.9 percent and 426 percent, respectively.
43FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JUNE/JULY 1987
two- and three-year periods are given along with the
peak increase over four quarters (in parentheses).
The bottom of table 2 illustrates the symmetric
response associated with the 1986 oil price decline.
Consumer price increases slowed sharply in each
country, except Canada where the slowing was slight,
During the first six months of 1987, however, the rate
ofprice increaserose sharply in all seven countries. In
all the countries except Italy, inflation was higher in
early 1987 than it had been in 1985, the year prior to
the oil shock.
CONCLUSION
The decline in oil prices in 1986 raised the question
of whether oil price shocks have syinmetric effects on
macroeconomic variables, The analysis presented
here indicates that energy price shocks matter be-
cause they affect economic capacity and hence pro-
ductivity of labor and capital resources, or aggregate
supply. Their specific effects on other macroeconomic
variables follow from the effects presented here. This
view suggests that oil price increases or decreases
have symmetric effects on the economy.
The United States had experienced a relatively large
decline in the relative prices of oil and energy from
1981 to 1985, adecline that exceeded the recent one in
1986, Thus, evidence on the adjustments of spending,
prices, output and productivity is available and de-
scribed here that bears on the symmetry question. The
evidence suggests that energy price shocks have sym-
metric effects, Formal tests of changing energy price
coefficients in reduced form equations and an aggre-
gate production function reject the asymmetry hy-
pothesis. Finally, consumer prices for the United
States and six other countries exhibit symmetric tem-
porary movements surrounding the 1986 oil price
decline.
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